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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance issues and the interactions 
among composite stakeholders may well be 
represented and interpreted in graphical terms, 
connecting stakeholding nodes (vertices) with their 
interactions (links or edges). 
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Traditional corporate governance patterns are based on the 
interaction among composite stakeholders and the various forms 
of separation between ownership and control. Stakeholders 
cooperate around the Coasian firm represented by a nexus of 
increasingly complex contracts. These well-known occurrences 
have been deeply investigated by growing literature and nurtured 
by composite empirical evidence. Apparently, unrelated network 
theory is concerned with the study of graphs as a representation 
of (a)symmetric relations between discrete objects (nodes 
connected by links). Network theory is highly interdisciplinary, 
and its versatile nature is fully consistent with the complex 
interactions of (networked) stakeholders, even in terms of game-
theoretic patterns. The connection between traditional corporate 
governance issues and network theory properties is, however, still 
under-investigated. Hence the importance of an innovative 
reinterpretation that brings to “network governance”. Innovation 
may, for instance, concern the principal-agent networked 
relationships and their conflicts of interest or the risk contagion 
and value drivers – three core governance issues. Networks and 
their applications (like blockchains, P2P platforms, game-theoretic 
interactions or digital supply chains) foster unmediated 
decentralization. In decentralized digital platforms stakeholders 
inclusively interact, promoting cooperation and sustainability. To 
the extent that network properties can be mathematically 
measured, governance issues may be quantified and traced with 
recursive patterns of expected occurrences. 
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Even though both corporate governance and 
network science are well-grounded theories, their 
possible connections have been hardly investigated. 
To the author‟s best knowledge, there are few 
specific studies about their joint analysis (the issue 
is partially addressed in Vermeulen, 2015 and in 
Bonacina et al., 2015). The research is so original 
and may ignite a new literature strand. 
Consistently with this conceptual framework, 
the research question of this study is concerned 
with the (innovative) possibility to represent the 
interactions among stakeholders – a core corporate 
governance concern – through network patterns and 
their (mathematical) properties.  
Each stakeholder represents a node that is 
linked through edges with other nodes. Nodes have 
different degrees of (hierarchical) importance, and 
pivoting stakeholders are the bridging vertices that 
connect a higher number of other stakeholders and 
vehiculate more “traffic” (information, decisions, 
transactions, etc.). Network theory may so represent 
the corporate governance interactions among 
composite stakeholders (both inside and outside the 
firm) in a complementary way, using an innovative 
interdisciplinary approach. 
The expression “network governance” has 
already been used by Jones et al., 1997, referring to 
some interaction between transaction cost 
economics and social network theories. Assens and 
Lemeur (2016) show that to minimize uncertainty, 
enterprises try to organize their partner 
relationships into a network, in which the principles 
of trust and reciprocity prevail. By definition, a 
network is a collaborative structure, which depends 
neither on the market nor on the hierarchy. The 
perimeter of this study is, however, wider, as it 
considers further aspects (reported in the list below) 
that are traditionally included in the corporate 
governance perimeter of investigation. 
To the extent that networks can be expressed in 
mathematical terms, through adjacency or incidence 
matrices, interactions among stakeholders may be 
measured, especially if they follow recursive patterns 
that may be interpreted with artificial intelligence 
through specifically designed algorithms. 
The main corporate governance issues that can 
be interpreted using network theory may, for 
instance, concern: 
1. Diffused versus concentrated ownership 
structure, and the consequent links between many 
or few “nodes” of shareholders with the firm and the 
other stakeholders; 
2. Large versus fragmented creditors (the 
former represent bridging nodes with intense 
relationships with the firm and other smaller and 
scattered nodes); 
3. The link between the (listed) firm, its stock 
market, and the worldwide markets, each 
representing a node correlated to the others; 
4. A reinterpretation of the theory of the firm 
as a Coasian nexus (network) of contracts; 
5. The spread of information among 
networked stakeholders; 
6. Value creation with digital scalability, where 
intangible nodes grow exponentially, increasing the 
value of the network; 
7. Value destruction due to (strategic) node 
deletion; 
8. Interfirm coordination; 
9. Interlocking directorship among board 
members of different firms; 
10. The impact of network analysis and game 
theory on interactive agents; 
11. Digital platforms that represent a “virtual” 
(intangible/figurative) stakeholder. 
Network theory is important as an additional 
explanatory factor of corporate governance (this 
being the main research question of this study).  
It is also worth investigating since it is likely to 
disrupt, together with digital platforms, artificial 
intelligence, and blockchains, traditional (analogic) 
business models. The impact on corporate 
governance (Brennan et al., 2019), albeit still under-
investigated, is also likely to be meaningful. 
The study is organized as follows: after an 
introductory section about network theory, the 
primary governance points will be synthetically 
analyzed, with emphasis on the open issues that are 
closer to a “networked” interpretation.  
A discussion with indications for future 
research and some critical considerations precedes 
the concluding remarks. 
 
2. NETWORK THEORY 
 
Network theory (Barabási, 2016) is the study of 
graphs as a representation of either symmetric 
relations or asymmetric relations between discrete 
objects. In computer science and network science, 
network theory is a part of graph theory: a network 
can be defined as a graph in which nodes and/or 
edges have attributes (e.g., names). 
An interdependent network is a system of 
coupled networks where nodes of one or more 
networks depend on nodes in other networks. Such 
dependencies are enhanced by developments in 
modern technology. Dependencies may lead to 
cascading failures between the networks, and a 
relatively small failure can lead to a catastrophic 
breakdown of the system (as shown in Section 7). 
Blackouts are a demonstration of the important role 
played by the dependencies between networks.  
Networks represent a fundamental 
characteristic of complex systems whose connected 
structure may give an innovative interpretation of 
the interactions among (linked) stakeholders. 
Network theory has applications in many 
disciplines, including statistical physics, particle 
physics, computer science, electrical engineering, 
biology, economics, finance, operations research, 
climatology, ecology, and sociology. Applications of 
network theory include logistical networks, the 
World Wide Web, Internet, gene regulatory networks, 
epidemiology, metabolic networks, social networks, 
epistemological networks, etc.  
A scientific methodology often used in network 
theory is represented by induction: what can be 
shown for small networks may be intuitively 
extended to other networks (Estrada & Knight, 2015, 
p. 34). Pollination of well-established network theory 
applications (e.g., physics, computer science, 
electrical engineering, biology, epidemiology, 
climatology, etc.) may well address corporate 
governance issues with an interdisciplinary 
approach. 
The links of a network can be directed or 
undirected. Some systems have directed links, like 
the www, whose uniform resource locators (URL) 
point from one web document to the other, or phone 
calls, where one person calls the other. Other 
systems have undirected links, like transmission 
lines on the power grid, on which the electric current 
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can flow in both directions. A network is called 
directed (or digraph) if all its links are asymmetric, 
and cause-effect relationships are only one-way; it is 
called undirected if all its links are symmetric (one-
to-one). Some networks simultaneously have 
directed and undirected links.  
Most relationships in corporate governance are 
bi-directional and so undirected. 
A vital property of each node is its degree, 
representing the number of links it has to other 
nodes. The degree is an important parameter even in 
corporate governance, as it identifies the 
connections among stakeholders and their intensity. 
Edges among nodes (i.e., stakeholders) represent 
(Estrada & Knight, 2015): 
  Physical links (pairs of nodes can be 
physically connected by a tangible link); 
  Physical interactions (connection 
determined by a physical force); 
  Ethereal (intangible) connections 
(information or other immaterial links); 
  Geographic closeness between nodes; 
  Social connections (friendship, 
collaboration, family ties, etc.); 
  Functional linking (actions that activate 
other activities). 
Nodes may not be directly linked by an edge 
but still have some bridging relationships, through a 
walk (trail) among distinct edges.  
The study of degree distribution is particularly 
suited to the analysis of complex networks (Estrada 
& Knight, 2015, p. 95). 
Scale-free networks are consistent with 
corporate governance patterns and with the 
presence of hubs represented by pivoting 
stakeholders (large creditors; managers; key 
shareholders, etc.). Once the hubs are present, they 
fundamentally change the system‟s behavior. 
Networks can be interpreted in both static and 
dynamic terms that represent their evolution and 
may also be used for predictive purposes. Evolving 
networks can predict the growth rate of a node that 
may depend on its age and contribute to the 
interpretation of dynamic governance issues. 
Another important concept is represented by 
internal links. In many networks, new links not only 
arrive with new nodes but are added between pre-
existing nodes. For example, most new links on the 
www are internal links, corresponding to newly 
added URLs between pre-existing web documents. 
Similarly, virtually all new social/friendship links 
form between individuals that already have other 
friends and acquaintances. 
Internal links represent an essential feature of 
the firm that has a strong bulk of inside 
stakeholders that are closely tied among them, with 
further links to other external stakeholders. 
Figure 1 shows how internal and external 
stakeholders interact around the company that 
represents the pivoting hub. 
 
Figure 1. External vs. internal stakeholders 
 
 
 
2.1. Social networks 
 
Social network analysis examines the structure of 
organizational networks and relationships between 
social entities that can be represented by interacting 
stakeholders.  
(Social) networks are often used to interpret the 
behavior of communities. The employees of a 
company are more likely to interact with their 
co-workers than with employees of other companies. 
Consequently, workplaces appear as densely 
interconnected communities within the social 
network. Communities can be detected with 
hierarchical clustering that is based on a similarity 
matrix that measures the distance between two 
nodes. Communities can be dense or sparse, are 
typically overlapping and they have communicating 
and clustering links. Communities in social networks 
tend to be nucleated around strong ties that may be 
represented by hubs. These properties have evident 
governance implications. 
Assortativity (assortative mating) is a 
preference for a network‟s nodes to attach to others 
that are similar. Though the specific measure of 
similarity may vary, network theorists often examine 
assortativity in terms of a node's degree. The 
addition of this characteristic to network models 
approximates the behaviors of many real-world 
networks. Assortative mating reflects the tendency 
of individuals to date or marry individuals that are 
similar to them. In assortative networks, hubs tend 
to connect to other hubs and small-degree nodes to 
similar nodes. In a network environment, we can 
also encounter the traditional assortativity, when 
nodes of similar properties link to each other.  
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Correlations between nodes of similar degree 
are often found in the mixing patterns of many 
observable networks. For instance, in social 
networks, nodes tend to be connected with other 
nodes with similar degree values. This tendency is 
referred to as assortative mixing, or assortativity. On 
the other hand, technological and biological 
networks typically show disassortative mixing, or 
disassortativity, as high degree nodes tend to attach 
to low degree nodes (Newman, 2002).  
In assortative networks, nodes of comparable 
degree tend to link to each other: small-degree 
nodes to small-degree nodes and hubs to hubs. In 
neutral networks, nodes link to each other 
randomly. In disassortative networks, hubs tend to 
connect to small-degree nodes and small-degree 
nodes to hubs. Social networks are assortative, and 
stakeholders typically behave accordingly. 
Figure 2 shows an example of stakeholders 
(whose different colors represent an example of 
their belonging to specific clusters, e.g., suppliers) 
that interact following a social network pattern. 
Dyadic and triadic relationships become multi-sided 
thanks to the belonging to the systemic network. 
The (black) hub is represented by the networking 
firm, consistently with Figure 11. 
 
Figure 2. Interaction among users of a social network 
 
 
 
2.2. Clustering networks 
 
Many real-world networks are characterized by the 
presence of a relatively large number of triangles. 
A network formed by triangles joined at a 
central node (Estrada & Knight, 2015, p. 103) can be 
represented in Figure 3. Each triangle represents a 
theoretical cluster where a class of stakeholders 
(e.g., suppliers, clients, managers, and other 
employees, etc.) synergistically interact around the 
hub firm that constitutes the bridging node. Supplier 
network issues have been analyzed, for instance, in 
Hernawati and Surya (2019). Connections between 
each cluster are typically mediated by the firm. 
 
Figure 3. Clustering triangular networks 
 
 
 
This representation is consistent with a firm 
(hub at the center) and its stakeholders that can be 
grouped in converging triangles, each representing a 
category (shareholders, managers, employees, etc.). 
Adjacent triangles may well be linked among them. 
 
3. DIFFUSED OR CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE? PUBLIC COMPANIES VERSUS FAMILY 
BUSINESSES 
 
The ownership structure considers two corner 
solutions where shareholders are either diffused 
(mainly in listed public companies) or concentrated 
in family businesses. The number of the 
shareholders (each representing a node) and the 
links among them and with other stakeholders are 
entirely consistent with network theory. 
Diffused ownership is typical of large 
corporations that are listed and are characterized by 
a high degree of separation between ownership and 
control: atomized shareholders act like principals 
that delegate the management of the firm to 
professional agents. 
In family businesses, principals and agents 
tend to overlap and, in many cases, coincide. 
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Internal ties are stronger within the family firm, 
whose dimensions are typically smaller than that of 
public companies. The obsession of keeping control 
under the family limits growth opportunities. Under 
a network theory interpretation, this is a case where 
dominating hubs, expressing the control over the 
company, are willing to persist over time, up to the 
point of limiting any expansion of the family firm 
network. Cohesion and concentration of ties may 
prevail over the sharing with external value 
co-creators. This model may be challenged by trendy 
business models that reshape companies around 
their customers, decentralizing its barycenter. 
Diffused ownership in public companies can be 
interpreted in terms of networking links among 
stakeholders (nodes), without (Figure 4) or with 
(Figure 5) the intermediation of institutional 
investors. Professional investors often act as proxy-
collectors, concentrating the voting power and 
acting as a networking hub linked to otherwise 
uncorrelated nodes. 
 
Figure 4. Networking stakeholders in a public company 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Institutional investors (proxy-holders) in a public company 
 
 
 
Family businesses or even public companies 
may be part of a group that can be pyramidal or take 
the shape of a “comb” and develops horizontally, as 
shown in Figures 6 and 7. In the former case, there 
is stock leverage, according to which the ultimate 
shareholders of the holding company minimize the 
equity-holding necessary to control the operating 
companies. This brings to well-known opportunistic 
behaviors. 
Both structures can be conceived in terms of 
networks, where each firm is the node, and 
shareholdings represent the edge. 
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Figure 6. Pyramidal group 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Horizontal group 
 
 
 
Shareholders are fragmented in family 
businesses that get articulated along with 
generations, for inheritance reasons. Common 
control can be kept through unifying holding 
companies that are positioned at the vertex (hub 
node) of the group. If the tree ramification of the 
family grows above the holding company, then 
control over the operative firms is preserved, as 
shown in Figure 8. Trees are graphs lacking cycles, 
and they are rooted if they have a single vertex (van 
Steen, 2010; Chapter 5), for instance, represented by 
the holding company that serves as a bridging hub, 
concentrating otherwise dispersed shareholders. 
 
 
Figure 8. Ascendant generational ramification (preserving the “hub/bridging” node - holding company) 
 
 
 
Group companies may be represented by 
articulated networks in the case of the interlocking 
Japanese keiretsu or the Korean chaebol (Han, 2016), 
synthetically recalled in Section 8. 
The separation of ownership from control is a 
classic corporate governance concern. As Tirole 
(2006, p. 15) points out “in 1932, Berle and Means 
wrote a pathbreaking book documenting the 
separation of ownership and control in the United 
States. They showed that shareholder dispersion 
creates substantial managerial discretion, which can 
be abused. This was the starting point for the 
subsequent academic thinking on corporate 
governance and corporate finance”. Shareholder 
dispersion may well be explained and mapped with 
network theory. 
4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
 
When a firm is listed, its ownership is diffused (see 
Section 3), and the market value of its shares reflects 
the stock market price. The market price of the firm 
is sensitive to the domestic stock market that hosts 
the firm, and the sensitivity parameter is expressed 
by the beta (β) of the listed stock against the 
volatility of the market. 
But stock markets are also linked among them 
and so the intrinsic volatility of each market is 
transmitted to other markets through their 
correlation: the higher the correlation, the bigger the 
risk-sharing through contagion. 
The interactions between the listed firm and 
the other firms of the same (domestic) market 
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contribute to the overall market volatility. 
Interconnectivity among stock markets brings to 
overall volatility (systemic risk) that cannot be 
further reduced through international 
diversification. 
These well-known properties can be interpreted 
in network terms that represent the macro-links 
between the stock exchanges and the micro-links 
within domestic stock markets. Spreading 
phenomena and epidemic modeling of contact 
networks can explain the propagation of risk among 
different stock markets.  
Figure 9 contains an example of the link 
between a networked world‟s map and the impact of 
international portfolio diversification on 
diversifiable and idiosyncratic risk. This is 
consistent with an interpretation of the volatility 
and correlation among the global stock markets that 
might be explained using network theory (Baumohl 
et al., 2018). 
 
Figure 9. International portfolio diversification 
 
 
 
Connections among firms may have undesired 
side-effects when they propagate risk. Contagion 
works at a macro level, for instance, through the 
interaction of stock markets whose correlation (that 
is increasing due to globalization) is a transmission 
factor of volatility sharing. At a meso or micro level, 
a domino effect propagates risk among different 
firms, especially in sensitive industries (like the 
financial sector, where defaults may quickly become 
systemic, as shown in Section 7). 
Contagion is eased by systemic networking 
that, in this case, shows its negative externalities. 
Increased globalization, even due to technological 
advances that make communication easier and 
faster, fosters correlation and so transmission of 
volatility. 
Governance consequences may be relevant. 
Within this framework, technology is a double-edged 
sword that may reduce information asymmetries but 
also increase the speed of contagion, fake news, and 
overreaction. 
 
5. THE FIRM AS A COASIAN NEXUS (NETWORK) OF 
CONTRACTS 
 
The firm can be considered as a nexus of contracts 
both internally, so justifying in a Coasian way its 
very existence, and externally, should agreements 
with third parties be considered within a broader 
framework.  
This interpretation is entirely consistent with 
the network theory since nexuses are the links 
among different nodes (here represented by 
composite stakeholders, in a multilayer framework). 
Consider an initial situation where there is no firm. 
Each node represented by a blue circle can have 
different links with the others. Figure 10 shows an 
increasingly linked framework where the network (a) 
is initially empty (since there are no links among the 
different nodes) and then becomes increasingly 
linked with more and more edges (b → c →d). 
 
Figure 10. Network (without a firm) 
 
 
 
A different situation occurs when, at the center 
of the “crossroad” among the different nodes, there 
is a hub represented by the firm.  
Nodes are increasing. In the situation 
represented by (e) in Figure 11, the hub is the only 
pivoting entity: each stakeholder must pass through 
the hub to communicate with another node; in 
situation (f) or (g) nodes are also (increasingly) 
linked among them, without necessarily passing 
through the hub. 
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Figure 11. Network with a hub firm 
 
 
 
From Figures 10 and 11, it intuitively appears 
that the hub/firm adds value to the whole network. 
This may be considered a “graph-theory” 
interpretation of the theory of the firm.  
Blockchains are likely to reshape networking 
interactions. The blockchain is a decentralized and 
distributed digital ledger that corresponds to an 
open database with a pattern of sharable and 
unmodifiable data that are sequenced in 
chronological order, following a networked pattern. 
Due to their decentralization characteristics, 
they may reduce the importance of concentrating 
(monopolistic) hubs. Governance consequences are 
many: they can help promote transparency, build 
trust and reputation, and enhance efficiency in 
transactions, reducing information asymmetries and 
moral hazard (di Prisco, 2019).  
Corporate governance structures and firms 
connected through digital platforms become 
decentralized, unmediated (Fenwick et al., 2017), 
and interconnected. Networks are frequently 
horizontal, open, and autonomous: the way 
stakeholders interact is profoundly reshaped, with 
disruptive governance consequences: 
 vertical hierarchies (typical of family 
businesses or multinational firms) are 
replaced by sharing mechanisms; 
 stewardship changes accordingly and is 
replaced by horizontal cooperation among 
interacting stakeholders;  
 personalized consumer experience 
increasingly matters in unmediated 
transactions;  
 relationships become flat and inclusive;  
 peer-to-peer transactions replace traditional 
supply chain patterns. 
Nexuses of contracts are also consistent with 
supply and value chains, where stakeholders interact 
to co-create shared value. These aspects will be 
synthetically examined in Sections 9 and 12. 
External nexuses of contracts typically involve 
synergic stakeholders, linked to the firm with pass-
through contracts or other cooperation agreements. 
While stakeholders always include shareholders, 
they are also represented by debtholders, clients, 
suppliers, workers, and public authorities, up to the 
civil society surrounding the company and 
interested in its well-being. 
Vertical integration represents a well-known 
form of networked cooperation, within the “make it 
or buy” strategic decision that stands out as one of 
the essential elements of the theory of the firm, as 
illustrated by Williamson (1985), Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1989), and Hart (1995, Part I). In 
microeconomics, vertical integration describes a 
management control system where a common owner 
controls companies within a vertical supply chain. 
The specialization of each firm within the vertical 
value chain allows a synergic combination of 
products and services, cementing upstream buyers 
with downstream suppliers. 
The value chain is consistent with the 
networking stakeholders that rotate around it. 
The Coasian rationale behind the ontological 
existence of the firm, considered as a nexus of 
contracts, may tentatively be extended to a wider 
framework where the firm is analyzed within its 
broader legal “web”. The internal nexus of contracts 
may so be expanded to consider also external legal 
agreements. The firm is the “glue” that brings 
together many heterogeneous stakeholders. 
The Coasian theory of the firm is linked to 
transaction economics. Ketokivi and Mahoney (2017) 
ask some critical questions about the issue: “Which 
components should a manufacturing firm make in-
house, which should it co-produce, and which 
should it outsource? Who should sit on the firm‟s 
board of directors? What is the right balance 
between debt and equity financing? These questions 
may appear different on the surface, but they are all 
variations on the same theme: how should a 
complex contractual relationship be governed to 
avoid waste and to create transaction value? 
Transaction Cost Economics is one of the most 
established theories to address this fundamental 
question”. 
The concept of node centrality (Estrada & 
Knight, 2015, Chapter 14) is used in the 
determination of the most critical nodes in a 
network, acting as hubs. Their characteristics 
include the ability to communicate directly with 
other nodes, their closeness to other nodes, and 
their role to act as a communicator between 
different parts of a network. Usefulness – up to 
indispensability - of central nodes is entirely 
consistent with the Coasian nature of the firm as a 
nexus (network) of contracts and ties among 
composite stakeholders.  
Degree centrality measures the ability of a node 
to communicate directly with others, this being a 
founding characteristic of the firm. Firms also have 
a closeness centrality, having the shortest path 
distance with other nodes represented by 
surrounding stakeholders. Furthermore, firms are 
characterized by their betweenness centrality that 
represents a vital communication node between 
other pairs of nodes. Closeness to other nodes is 
important even in terms of higher influence. 
Communities in networks (Estrada & Knight, 
2015, Chapter 21) represent an explanation of the 
organization of nodes in complex networks. 
Communities are groups of nodes more densely 
connected amongst themselves than with the rest of 
the nodes of the network. Communities may be 
represented by social networks (see Section 2.1) and 
may be magnetized by hub-nodes represented by the 
firm that clusters stakeholders with its gravitational 
centrality. 
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The firm is seen as a contract among a 
multitude of parties (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989), and 
this vision is consistent with an interaction of 
networked stakeholders. 
 
6. THE SPREAD OF INFORMATION (BIG DATA) 
AMONG NETWORKED STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Communicability accounts for the volume of 
information transmitted from one node to another 
in a network by using all possible routes (direct 
links, paths, trails, etc.) between them. Shorter 
linking routes are given more weight than longer 
ones (Estrada & Knight, 2015, Chapter 19). 
Information asymmetries – a key concept in 
corporate governance and a primary source of 
conflicts of interest among stakeholders – arise 
when communicability is interrupted or non-existent 
and are more frequent in directed networks, where 
information flows are not reciprocal between two 
connected nodes. 
Information asymmetries traditionally arise in a 
corporate governance context where borrowers have 
better information about their creditworthiness than 
the lending bank. They originate conflicts of interest 
that might seriously prevent an efficient allocation 
of finance: the liquidity allocation problem derives 
from the fact that although money is abundant, it is 
nevertheless not easy to give it to the right and 
deserving borrowers. Managers, for instance, 
incorporate informative privileges that are 
discounted with other stakeholders (Myers, Majluf, 
1984), increasing the cost of capital and eventually 
destroying value. 
Adverse selection is another typical problem in 
money lending, and it occurs when banks – not 
knowing who is who – cannot easily discriminate 
between good and risky borrowers, who should 
deserve higher interest rate charges. 
Moral hazard is a classical “take the money and 
run problem” since borrowers might try to flee with 
the bank‟s money or try not to fully engage them in 
the project for which they have been financed. 
These classical corporate governance problems 
are well-known in traditional banking and they 
naturally bring to sub-optimal allocation of financial 
resources. The consequent capital rationing 
problems frequently affect potentially sound 
borrowers, if they are not able to differentiate 
themselves from those who bluff. The theory of 
signaling states that information asymmetry 
between a firm and outsiders leads the former to 
make specific changes in its capital structure. Ross 
(1977), Myers & Majluf (1984), and John (1987) have 
shown that under asymmetric information, firms 
may prefer debt to equity financing. 
Information is conveyed through interactive 
networks, and so its representation and analysis are 
entirely consistent with network theory. 
The network data that most impacts on 
information sharing is represented by the World 
Wide Web and the Internet. 
While the terms www and internet are often 
used interchangeably in the media, they refer to 
different systems. The www is an information 
network, whose nodes are documents and links are 
URLs. In contrast, the Internet is an infrastructural 
network, whose nodes are computers called routers 
and whose links correspond to physical connections, 
like copper and optical cables or wireless links. The 
degree distribution of both networks is well 
approximated by a power-law, and so these 
networks are scale-free. On the Internet, a few highly 
connected hubs hold together numerous small 
nodes. 
Network theory can be linked to big data, 
primarily through digital platforms that convey 
information in real-time. Value chains based on 
traditional databases become networked when they 
are linked to other chains through value-adding 
networks. Value chain networks are more resilient 
and able to cope with risks of failure, enabling 
alternatives.  
Networked value chains fueled by big data 
stand out as the best value-maximizing option, as 
illustrated in Figure 12. 
Degree, correlations, clustering, and centrality 
provide information on single nodes, their 
immediate surroundings, and their position 
concerning the overall network (Caldarelli & 
Catanzaro, 2012). These features are networked 
informative nodes. Edging big data correlated to 
nodes disseminate extensive information in real-
time. 
The topology of networks, so crucial for their 
interpretation, is based on computing the edge 
betweenness that finds the edges through which 
most of the shortest paths pass.  
Websites and the internet can be interpreted in 
terms of network science, being represented by 
relations among vertices and their connecting edges. 
 
 
Figure 12. Network of value chains 
 
 
Source: taken from Moro Visconti et al., 2017 
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Social networks, continuously fuelled by big 
data collection and processing, show the dynamic 
relationships among social entities (persons, groups, 
etc.). Along the value chain, they mainly develop the 
sharing phase. Big data processing of social network 
contents is quite complicated since the wording is 
semantically hard to interpret and classify. 
 
7. FROM NODE DELETION TO VALUE DESTRUCTION 
 
Whenever a node is deleted (see Section 2.3), the 
value is destroyed. If the node is central, due to its 
strategic importance and its bridging intermediation 
function, its removal may severely impair the firm 
and its internal/external nexuses, up to a default 
scenario. 
Contagion is a process whereby the collapse of 
a node in a network leads to the destruction of 
neighboring nodes and thereby sets off a chain 
reaction in the network. It thus creates a special type 
of time-dependent network. Such processes are 
studied in various applications, for example, in 
financial network analysis, infection diffusion 
prediction, supply-chain management, or gene 
regulation (van Landesberger et al., 2013). This 
confirms that network theory is a highly 
interdisciplinary discipline. 
Destruction or removal of a node may cause 
cascading implications due to domino effects, 
especially in bi-directional (undirected) networks 
where links are one-to-one. 
Examples may be given by the disappearance of 
a strategic supplier, default of an important client 
with economic and financial drawbacks that can 
undermine the survival chances of the firm, 
abandonment of critical employees and managers 
(especially in small firms), withdrawal of a 
significant creditor (bank), etc. 
The resilience of the firm and its ability to cope 
with adversities can be measured even in terms of 
capacity to rebuild the network when key nodes 
disappear. 
Node deletion may disrupt the supply (and the 
value) chain that after being broken might be re-
arranged substituting disappearing nodes or broken 
links. Not all nodes are equally essential and 
whenever a strategic node-firm is deleted, 
consequences are harder and networked contagion 
sours. This is, for instance, the case in the banking 
industry, where defaults are often systemic, as 
shown by the 2008 subprime crisis. Interconnections 
among financial institutions create potential 
channels for contagion and amplification of shocks 
to the financial system (Glasserman & Young, 2015).  
Node deletion and its analysis in terms of 
network theory may give a complementary 
explanation of bankruptcy issues and contagion 
externalities that destroy stakeholder value. 
Interpretation, prevention, and mitigation of 
defaults through dynamic network theory may 
contribute to mitigate the devastating effects of a 
crisis, detecting its domino impact on related firms.  
Timely prevention and identification of “patient 
zero” before contagion are consistent with big data 
velocity and alert processing in real-time. Tracking 
of possible interactions through network mapping is 
also useful to prevent unwanted transmission of 
contagious criticalities. 
 
8. INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSHIP 
 
A keiretsu (系列), literally system, series, a grouping of 
enterprises, an order of succession) is a set of 
companies with interlocking business relationships 
and shareholdings. It is a type of informal business 
group. The keiretsu maintained dominance over the 
Japanese economy for the second half of the 20th 
century. 
Interlocking rotates around corporate centrality, 
a concept with two components, many interlocks, 
plus the degree to which those interlocks are with 
other companies with many interlocks. In the past, 
banks were invariably the most central organizations 
in the corporate network (Domhoff, 2016). 
Interlocking is entirely consistent with a 
networked representation of related directors that 
link different firms. Each director in a firm that is also 
present in other boards represents a node intertwined 
with specular director-nodes. Network theory can 
help to map these relations and measure their 
intensity, easing the prevention of abuses and 
conflicts of interest.  
Networks are likely to deeply reshape the 
workings of the board of directors, easing distant and 
timely meetings, and the assortative selection of 
board members. Artificial intelligence applications 
may envisage “virtual” directors, and foster big data 
analysis, with an impact on decision-making and 
strategic execution. The synergistic interaction of big 
data sources and artificial intelligence applications 
may also allow for processing massive information in 
real-time, improving the effectiveness and depth of 
monitoring functions. 
Interlocking directorates and corporate 
networks are examined in Sapinski & Carroll (2018). 
Each type of interlock goes along with unique 
knowledge-based, social influence-related and 
institutional benefits and costs (Brennecke & Rank, 
2017). The corporate governance concerns that they 
raise, first due to the concentration of power in the 
hands of large firms and banks, may be mapped with 
graph (network) theory. 
 
9. INTERNATIONAL GROUP GOVERNANCE: A 
NETWORKED RATIONALE BEHIND THE 
MULTINATIONAL FIRM 
 
A multinational corporation is a corporate 
organization that owns or controls the production of 
goods or services in at least one country other than 
its home country. The rationale of multinational 
enterprises has long been debated (Contractor, 2012). 
A graphical representation of the linked firms, 
typically with a holding company located in one 
country and several subsidiaries located elsewhere, is 
entirely consistent with the network theory. Figure 13 
shows a simple example of how firms belonging to a 
multinational group are linked among them. There 
are three main hubs in North America, Europe, and 
Africa. In the graph, some nodes are not directly 
linked to the other (e.g., Europe must use the pass-
through North American node to reach Africa). The 
architecture of the group and its governance might be 
modified to allow for more intense networking, so 
improving the overall value of the network (according 
to Metcalfe‟s law, examined in Section 12). 
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Figure 13. Geographical network of firms belonging to the same group 
 
 
Source: adapted from Shutterstock.com 
 
Geographical networks and geolocalization 
issues may contribute to the explanation of 
multinational concerns that impact on governance, 
like for example, transfer pricing issues or antitrust 
concerns (that increasingly address tech-giants and 
their monopolistic digital platforms). 
Digital supply chains and horizontal interactions 
among scattered stakeholders reshape traditional 
business models, with profound implications on 
multinationals with hierarchical governance 
structures.  
Inclusive platform companies endanger 
incumbent multinationals, challenging consolidated 
value propositions with decentralized strategies. 
Network externalities that threaten consolidated 
family businesses affect even multinationals and their 
hierarchical structure. Disintermediation through 
networked blockchains reshapes consolidated 
businesses and industries, challenging their resilience 
to digital market trends. 
 
10. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CROWDFUNDING 
 
A social network is a social structure made up of a set 
of social actors (such as individuals or organizations), 
sets of dyadic ties, and other social interactions 
between actors. The social network perspective 
provides a set of methods for analyzing the structure 
of whole social entities as well as a variety of theories 
explaining the patterns observed in these structures 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The study of these 
structures uses social network analysis to identify 
local and global trends, locate influential entities, and 
examine network dynamics. Social media reshape and 
disintermediate the firm communication and are a 
core component of strategies that look for viral 
scalability of revenues and shared trust-building. 
Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a 
project or venture by raising small amounts of money 
from many people, typically via the Internet and 
through social network platforms. In crowdfunding, a 
digital platform is a connecting hub (bridging node) 
among the different equity-holders. 
P2P lending follows networked value co-creating 
patterns that reshape traditional ownership & control 
mechanisms. Even the cost of collected capital and its 
embedded risky component follow innovative paths 
where upside potential is shared since inception. 
Trendy monitoring is secured by continuous 
feedbacks that nurture big data and artificial 
intelligence, softening information asymmetries. 
To the extent that differences between 
expectations and real outcomes are reduced by timely 
evidence, risk should also decrease (so reducing the 
cost of capital and improving Discounted Cash Flows), 
softening governance conflicts. 
Social networking around digital platforms also 
contributes to reshaping digitized supply and value 
chains, easing e-commerce B2B/B2C transactions, and 
the value co-creation patterns of the involved 
stakeholders. 
 
11. GAME THEORETIC NETWORKS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Network game theory is the combination of network 
analysis and game theory to the study of situations of 
interdependence between adaptive agents. Network 
game theory builds upon and expands classical game 
theory by incorporating the network of connections 
within which agents make their choices. In so doing it 
offers a richer model of the behavior of agents within 
games.  
Game theory is the study of mathematical 
models of strategic interaction between rational 
decision-makers (Aumann, 1987). Game types can be:  
1. Cooperative / Non-cooperative. A game is 
cooperative if the players can form binding 
commitments externally enforced (e.g., through 
contract law). A game is non-cooperative if players 
cannot form alliances or if all agreements need to be 
self-enforcing (e.g., through credible threats). 
2. Symmetric / Asymmetric. Asymmetric game 
is a game where the payoffs for playing a particular 
strategy depend only on the other strategies 
employed, not on who is playing them. If the 
identities of the players can be changed without 
changing the payoff to the strategies, then a game is 
symmetric. 
3. Zero-sum / Non-zero-sum. Zero-sum games 
are a special case of constant-sum games, in which 
choices by players can neither increase nor decrease 
the available resources. In zero-sum games, the total 
benefit to all players in the game, for every 
combination of strategies, always adds to zero (more 
informally, a player benefits only at the equal expense 
of others). 
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4. Simultaneous / Sequential. Simultaneous 
games are games where both players move 
simultaneously, or if they do not move 
simultaneously, the later players are unaware of the 
earlier players‟ actions (making them effectively 
simultaneous). Sequential games (or dynamic games) 
are games where later players have some knowledge 
about earlier actions. This need not be complete 
information about every action of earlier players; it 
might be very little knowledge. 
The link between game and network theories is 
evident. Still, even the connections with corporate 
governance can be easily evidenced if the patterns of 
interaction among different stakeholders are carefully 
analyzed. 
Game theory can improve the interpretation of 
reciprocal and contractual governance patterns. 
Game theory applications to finance 
discriminate between uninformed and informed 
agents, with applications to corporate control, capital 
structure, dividends, and stock repurchases, external 
financing, and financial intermediation (Thakor, 
1991). Corporate finance applications concern also 
the signaling model, agency costs, and other vital 
issues (Allen & Morris, 2014) that have strong links 
with corporate governance concerns. 
 
12. DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND SCALABLE VALUE 
 
Internet digital platforms are represented by a web 
browser where software interfaces interact. By using 
Internet platforms, businesses can create a competitive 
advantage and are a source of scalable value. 
Digital platforms enhance scalability, which 
indicates the ability of a process, network, or system to 
handle a growing amount of work, or its potential to be 
enlarged to accommodate growth. It enables a growth 
in revenues accompanied by a less than proportional 
increase in variable costs. Since scalability enhances 
growth, it has essential side-effects on governance 
issues. 
Digital scalability follows Metcalfe‟s law, 
according to which the effect of a telecommunications 
network is proportional to the square of the number of 
connected users of the system (n2). 
Digital transformation concerns both traditional 
companies that are undergoing a digitalization upgrade 
and native digital businesses. These complementary 
businesses interact and are part of complex 
ecosystems populated by composite stakeholders 
(Bonollo & Poopuu, 2019). 
Web platforms may be considered an “intangible 
stakeholder” that acts as an intermediating link among 
“physical” (traditional) stakeholders, representing the 
architectural framework of the firm‟s virtual network. 
Multi-stakeholder interactions in digital settings are 
examined by Viglia et al. (2017). Platforms reengineer 
supply and value chains, acting as digital hubs, and 
contributing to value-adding disintermediation. 
Web platforms perform their action in many 
ways, acting as: 
 An e-commerce site; 
 A P2P lending platform; 
 A FinTech enabler; 
 A blockchain backbone (for governance 
implications, see Yermack, 2017); 
 A mobile-App intermediary; 
 A social network interface, etc. 
Platforms are typically owned by IT or TLC giants, 
and catalyze information from users, collecting big 
data that can be stored and processed. Information 
asymmetries and their related conflicts of interest may 
be reduced, although sharing of data is often impaired, 
and dominant players (the interface owner) may extract 
monopolistic rents. 
 
13. DISCUSSION 
 
The breadth of the topic and the width of its 
applications represent a major cause of the study 
limitations that are also due to the novelty of the topic 
and to the lack of empirical evidence. Closer scrutiny of 
the different topics that have been synthetically 
described might be conducted, possibly using the 
mathematical background of the network (graph) 
theory as a unifying paradigm for systemic analysis. 
This preliminary study is still pioneering and is 
demanding for additional investigation, possibly 
igniting new literature strands. Some vital questions 
that may inspire future research remain largely 
unexplored: 
 Which are the links that represent the firm‟s 
network? What happens around the stakeholding 
nodes and their links? How strong are the links among 
different nodes (stakeholders)? Can they be measured 
and modelled mathematically? 
 Which are the changes in firm networks due 
to technology (digitalization; decentralization with 
blockchains; information sharing and processing with 
big data and artificial intelligence, etc.)? And how 
traditional firms that are “going digital” interact with 
digitally native companies? 
 Which are the hub nodes (the firm itself, and 
key stakeholders, etc.) and how they react to 
network/blockchain-driven decentralization? 
 Which are the dynamics that start from the 
“photography” of the network to estimate its outlook, 
even in terms of trendy sustainability? 
 Which is the impact on the cost of collecting 
capital for networked firms with value-sharing 
patterns? And to which extent the risky cost of capital 
incorporates sustainability patterns? 
 Which is the impact of networks on value 
creation (and co-creation), even considering the impact 
on volumes and economic/financial margins of digital 
scalability? 
 Which is the impact of horizontal networks 
and P2P stakeholders on hierarchy, ownership & 
control (that represent traditional corporate 
governance milestones)? 
 To which extent traditional stakeholders 
interact with digital platforms and networking 
backbones to co-create shared value? 
 Which are the interactions of networked firms 
with climatic changes and circular economic patterns 
within an overarching natural eco-system? And which 
are the network differences between standard 
supply/value chains, and circular economy chains, in 
terms of sustainability and impact on Customer Social 
Responsibility? 
Another trendy issue concerns digital platforms 
that work as bridging entities among networking 
stakeholders who use the platform to exchange 
information. Platforms may be considered as a new 
“virtual” actor, and interactions with traditional 
stakeholders are still under-investigated. Platforms are 
algorithmic intermediaries nurtured by big data stored 
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in the cloud that fuel artificial intelligence patterns. 
“Virtuality” derives from the intangible (fictitious) 
nature of the (digital) platform that may act as a 
bridging node among the different nodes-stakeholders 
that rotate around the firm, considered as a nexus 
(network) of contracts. This topic is dealt with in Moro 
Visconti (2019), where digital platforms are considered 
as a virtual stakeholder that acting as a bridging node 
favors the interaction among other nodes/stakeholders 
that are incentivized to co-create value. 
Digital connections are intrinsically intertwined 
with IT platforms. Spagnoletti et al. (2015, p. 364) 
accordingly define a digital platform as “a building 
block that provides an essential function to a 
technological system and serves as a foundation upon 
which complementary products, technologies, or 
services can be developed”. 
Digital platforms represent a cornerstone for e-
commerce, B2B and B2C transactions, and they reshape 
the architectural design of the digital ecosystem (see 
Wareham et al., 2014), to balance the different interests 
(with a trade-off between centralized versus distributed 
control), bypassing traditional vertical hierarchies. 
Corporate governance implications are meaningful, 
albeit under-explored. 
Linkages among different stakeholders can 
increasingly follow artificial intelligence patterns with 
deep corporate governance implications (Grove & 
Lockhart, 2019). Lasting and resilient networking may 
reduce short-termism and strategic myopia. 
A further issue is represented by network 
externalities that concern the effects a product or 
service have on a user while others are using the same 
or compatible products or services. These properties 
may well be extended to corporate governance 
investigation, even in terms of value co-creation 
paradigms or contagion (should the externalities be 
negative). 
 
14. CONCLUSION: BEYOND NETWORK THEORY - THE 
DARK SIDE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
This study contains a preliminary analysis of two 
classical issues – corporate governance and network 
theory – in a combined and innovative way that shows 
unexplored interactions. The main theme is that 
stakeholders represent the founding block of corporate 
governance and their intricate interactions can 
intuitively be represented by networks.  
Networks not only contribute to a better 
explanation of traditional corporate governance 
mechanisms but also, through their digital platform 
applications, disrupt traditional business models. 
Unmediated and technology-based corporate 
governance is deeply reshaped. If the firm dynamics is 
represented by more horizontal interactions of 
cooperating stakeholders, the difference between top-
down dirigisme and bottom-up participated feedback is 
reduced, creating shareable wealth through value co-
creation paradigms. 
These pioneering topics (that may be easily 
extended, addressing additional issues) need further 
analysis and may ignite new literature strands with 
interdisciplinary pollination – networking – of ideas 
and solutions that embrace technology, network 
theory, and corporate governance concerns. 
Even if network theory is extremely flexible and 
easily adaptable to many corporate governance issues, 
there are many concerns that may hardly be 
comprehensively interpreted with a network theory 
approach. This is reflected in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. Network theory, corporate governance, and its dysfunctions 
 
 
 
Governance failures are driven by agency 
problems (e.g., lack of managerial accountability; 
insufficient managerial effort; extravagant investments; 
entrenchment strategies; weak board of directors; 
moral hazard; adverse selection; self-dealing; strategic 
failure to avoid debt service, etc.) that may cause severe 
conflicts of interest among the stakeholders.  
Networks may partially record these dysfunctions 
(e.g., if they are originated by information asymmetries 
that can be traced within the network) and their 
negative externalities, for instance, if they reduce the 
“traffic” among specific nodes but can hardly be used 
to provide comprehensive explanations and solutions. 
The dark side of corporate governance that still 
puzzles investors is so far from being solved, even if 
an interdisciplinary approach that embodies network 
theory may substantially improve the comprehension 
of the governance conundrum. 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 17, Issue 1, Autumn 2019 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Allen, F., & Morris, S (2014). Game theory models in finance, In K. Chatterjee & W. Samuelson (Eds.), Game 
theory and business applications, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science (p.194). 
New York: Springer. 
2. Assens C., Lemeur A.C. (2016). Network Governance: The Theory. In: Networks Governance, Partnership 
Management and Coalitions, Federation. Governance and Public Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
3. Aumann, R. J. (1987). Game theory. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 2, 460-482. https://doi.org/ 
10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_942-1 
4. Bapat, R. B. (2011). Graphs and matrices. Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-1-84882-981-7 
5. Barabási A. (2016). Network science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from 
http://networksciencebook.com/ 
6. Baumöhl, E., Kočenda, E. E., Lyócsa, S., & Výrost, T. (2018). Networks of volatility spillovers among stock 
markets, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 490(15), 1555-1574. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.physa.2017.08.123 
7. Bengtsson, M., & Kock, S. (2000). Coopetition in business networks: To cooperate and compete simultaneously. 
Industrial Marketing Management, 29(5), 411-426. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0019-8501(99)00067-X 
8. Bonacina F.,  D‟Errico, M., Moretto, E., Stefani, S., Torriero, A.,& Zambruno, G. (2015). A multiple network 
approach to corporate governance, Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 49(4), 1585-1595. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-014-0075-y 
9. Bonollo, N., & Poopuu, P. (2019). The impact of digital platforms on roles and responsibilities in value creation 
among stakeholders of an ecosystem (Master‟s Thesis, Jönköping University). Retrieved from http://hj.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1321065/FULLTEXT01.pdf 
10. Brennan, N. M., Subramaniam, N. & van Staden, C. J. (2019). Corporate governance implications of disruptive 
technology: An overview. The British Accounting Review (available online). https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.bar.2019.100860 
11. Brennecke J. & Rank O.N., (2017). Tie heterogeneity in networks of interlocking directorates: A cost–benefit 
approach to firms‟ tie choice. Business Research, 10(1), 97–122. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40685-016-0042-7 
12. Caldarelli G., & Catanzaro, M. (2012). Networks. A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/ 9780199588077.001.0001 
13. Farok J. Contractor (2012). Why do multinational firms exist? A theory note about the effect of multinational 
expansion on performance and recent methodological critiques. Global Strategy Journal, 2(4), 318-331. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2042-5805.2012.01045.x 
14. Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(12), 386-405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
0335.1937.tb00002.x 
15. Degenne, A., & Forsé, M. (2006). Introducing social networks. London: SAGE Publications. 
16. Di Prisco, D. (2019). Blockchain and AI: The Technological Revolution‟s Impact on Corporate Governance 
Relationships. New Challenges in Corporate Governance: Theory and Practice, 368-381. https://doi.org/ 
10.22495/ncpr_47 
17. Domhoff, G. W. (2016). Interlocking directorates in the corporate community. Retrieved from 
https://dkydros.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/who-rules-america_-the-corporate-community.pdf 
18. Estrada, E., & Knight, P. A. (2015). A first course in network theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
19. Fama, E., (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/260866 
20. Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983a). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-
325. https://doi.org/ 10.1086/467037 
21. Fama, E., & Jensen, M., (1983b). Agency problems and residuals claims, Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 
327-349. https://doi.org/ 10.1086/467038 
22. Fenwick, M., McCahery, J.A. & Vermeulen, E. P.M., (2017). The End of 'Corporate' Governance: Hello „Platform‟ 
Governance (August 16, 2018). Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2018-5; 
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 430/2018. https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3232663   
23. Galvagno, M., & Dalli, D. (2014). Theory of value co-creation: A systematic literature review. Managing Service 
Quality, 24(6), 643-683. https://doi.org/10.1108/MSQ-09-2013-0187 
24. Glasserman, P., & Young, H. P. (2015). How likely is contagion in financial networks?, Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 50, 383-399. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.02.006 
25. Grossman, E. B., & Nakats, R. (2013). Crowdfunding and social network theory: An empirical investigation 
(Summary). Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, 33(3), Retrieved from https://digitalknowledge.babson.edu 
/fer/vol33/iss3/6 
26. Grove, H., & Lockhart, J. (2019). Evolution of corporate governance towards intrinsic value. Corporate Law & 
Governance Review, 1(1), 8-13. https://doi.org/10.22495/clgrv1i1p1 
27. Han, E. S. (2016). Network firms and corporate governance. Information, 19(11), 5075-5090. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316951488_Network_firms_and_corporate_governance 
28. Hart, O. (1995). Firms, contracts, and financial structure. London: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/ 
10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 
29. Hernawati, E., & Surya, R. L. (2019). The corporate governance, supplier network and firm supply performance. 
Uncertain Supply Chain Management, 7, 529-540. https://doi.org/10.5267/j.uscm.2018.11.003 
30. Holmstrom, B. R., & Tirole, J. (1989). The theory of the firm. Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1, 61-133. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01005-8 
31. Horn, R. A., & Johnson, C. R. (2012). Matrix analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
32. Jensen, M., & Meckling, W., (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership 
structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X 
33. Jones, C., Hesterly, W. S., Borgatti, S. P. (1997). A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions 
and social mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 911-945. https://doi.org/10.5465/ 
amr.1997.9711022109 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 17, Issue 1, Autumn 2019 
 
 
34. Ketokivi, M., & Mahoney, J. T. (2017). Transaction cost economics as a theory of the firm, management, and 
governance. Business and Management. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190224851.013.6 
35. Kostyuk, A., Mozghovyi, Y., & Govorun, D. (2018). Corporate governance, ownership and control: A review of 
recent scholarly research. Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition, 14(1), 50-56. https://doi.org/ 
10.22495/cbv14i1art4 
36. Kostyuk, A., & Tutino, M. (2019). Editorial: search for the advanced practices in corporate governance. 9-14. 
Retrieved from https:// www.researchgate.net/ requests/h0c6b8da49d4ab287495de502/landing  
37. Minichilli, A., Brogi, M., & Calabrò, A. (2015). Weathering the storm: Family ownership, governance, and 
performance through the financial and economic crisis. Corporate Governance. An International Review, 24(6), 
552-568. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12125 
38. Moro Visconti, R. (2015). Leveraging value with intangibles: More guarantees with less collateral? Corporate 
Ownership & Control, 13(1-2), 241-252. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i1c2p3 
39. Moro Visconti, R. (2019). Corporate governance, digital platforms and network theory: Value co-creation 
strategies of connected stakeholders (Working Paper, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore).  
40. Moro Visconti, R., Larocca, A., & Marconi, M. (2017). Big data-driven value chains and digital platforms: From 
value co-creation to monetization. In A. K. Somani & G. Deka (Eds.), Bigdata analytics: Tools, technology for 
effective planning. Boca Raton: CRC Press.  
41. Moro Visconti, R., Montesi, G., & Papiro, G. (2018). Big data-driven stochastic business planning and corporate 
valuation. Corporate Ownership & Control, 15(3-1), 189-204. http://doi.org/10.22495/cocv15i3c1p4. 
42. Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that 
investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187-221. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-
405X(84)90023-0 
43. Newman, M. E. J. (2002). Assortative mixing in networks. Physical Review Letter, 89(20). https://doi.org/ 
10.1103/PhysRevLett.89.208701 
44. Newman, M. E. J. (2010). Networks. An introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
45. Rindfleisch, R., O‟Hearn, M. (2010). Customer co‐creation: A typology and research agenda. Review of Marketing 
Research, 6, 84-106. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1548-6435(2009)0000006008 
46. Santella, P. (2000). The theory of the firm in a contractual perspective. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1748585 
47. Sapinski, J. P. & Carroll, W. K., (2018). Interlocking directorates and corporate networks, in Nolke A. & May C. 
eds., Handbook of the International Political Economy of the Corporation, Elgar publishing  
48. Shleifer A., & Vishny R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x 
49. Siebels, J., & Knyphausen‐Aufseß, D. (2012). A review of theory in family business research: The implications for 
corporate governance. International Journal of Management Review, 14(3), 280-304. https://doi.org/10.1111/ 
j.1468-2370.2011.00317.x 
50. Spagnoletti, P., Resca, A., & Lee, G. (2015). A design theory for digital platforms supporting online communities: 
a multiple case study, Journal of Information Technology, 30(4), 364–380. https://doi.org/ 10.1057/jit.2014.37 
51. Thakor, A. V. (1991). Game theory in finance. Financial Management, 20(1), 71-94. https://doi.org/ 
10.2307/3666098 
52. Tirole, J., (2006). The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton: Princeton University Press,  
53. Van Steen, M. (2010). Graph theory and complex networks. An Introduction. Poland: Maarten Van Steen. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230106505_1 
54. Vermeulen, E. P. M. (2015). Corporate governance in a networked age (Working Paper No. 2015-4). Retrieved 
from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2641441  
55. Verschoore, J. R., & Dill Zuquetto, R., (2016). A social network approach for crowdfunding. In J. Méric, I. Maque 
& J. Brabet (Eds.), International perspectives on crowdfunding (pp.151-167). https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-
78560-315-020151009 
56. Viglia, G., Pera, R., & Bigné, E.. (2017). The determinants of stakeholder engagement in digital platforms. Journal 
of Business Research, 89, 404-410. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.12.029 
57. Vismara, S. (2015). Equity retention and social network theory in equity crowdfunding. https://doi.org/ 
10.2139/ssrn.2654325 
58. von Landesberger, T., Diel, S., Bremm, S., & Fellner, D. W., (2013). Visual analysis of contagion in networks, 
Information Visualization, 14(2), 93-110. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473871613487087 
59. Wareham, J., Fox, P. B., & Cano Giner, J. L. (2014). Technology Ecosystem Governance, Organization Science, 
25(4), 1195–1215. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0895 
60. Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social network analysis in the social and behavioral sciences. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511815478.002 
61. Williamson, O. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.  
62. Williamson, O. (1988). Corporate finance and corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 43(3), 567-592. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2328184 
63. Yermack, D. (2017). Corporate governance and blockchains, Review of Finance, 21(1), 7-31. https://doi.org/ 
10.1093/rof/rfw074 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
